In Justice Investments Limited v Visalia Energía SL and others [2026] EWHC 676 (KB), Mrs Justice Eady DBE dealt with a number of procedural issues arising in somewhat unusual circumstances in claims by an English corporate litigant-in-person (LIP) against a Barcelona-based energy company and four other Spanish defendants.
At [85]-[97], the Court considered an application by D1/D2 made in response to the Claimant sending letters to 14 Spanish regulatory bodies and financial and commercial institutions in which it misrepresented events at previous hearings in the English proceedings, as well as making serious and baseless allegations about D1/D2’s counsel and solicitors.
Eady J accepted D1/D2’s criticisms of the letters and was unable to see that they had been sent for any legitimate purpose. She drew the inference they had been sent to damage D1/D2’s business interests and/or to put pressure on them in the English proceedings. She held this amounted to an abuse of the English court’s process, albeit a specific and relatively confined one which could be proportionately addressed by making the order sought by D1/D2, restricting the Claimant’s future use of disclosed documents (even where read to or by the Court or referred to at a public hearing), and court transcripts, in third-party communications.
At [70]-[84], the Court considered a case-management issue on which there is limited prior guidance regarding how and when to assess damages against non-participating defendants following default judgment on an unliquidated claim where there are also participating defendants contesting liability.
The Claimant argued that the Court should proceed to determine at a disposal hearing the outstanding causation and damages issues following from a default judgment entered against D3-D5, who had not engaged with the proceedings. D1/D2, who are actively defending the claims, argued that the damages disposal hearing against D3-D5 should be adjourned to the trial of the claims against D1/D2, with liberty to apply to restore the disposal hearing only in the event of a withdrawal or earlier resolution of the claims against D1/D2.
The Court held that adjournment was the appropriate course: [80]-[84]. The evidence was that the Claimant would suffer little real-world prejudice from a delay in disposal against D3-D5 and there were significant advantages to dealing with all issues together. Although a damages assessment following default judgment against D3-D5 only would not be formally binding on D1/D2 (Page v Champion Financial Management Ltd [2014] EWHC 1778 QB), it would require the Claimant to prove causation and loss against D3-D5 to the civil standard of proof and involve the Court making detailed findings on issues that also arose in the claims against D1/D2. It was not in the interests of justice to determine those issues without the benefit of full disclosure from D1/D2 and only hearing one side of the case. Dealing with all issues at once at the trial of the claims against D1/D2 would be less wasteful of Court resources and would avoid the possibility of inconsistent judgments.
At [98]-[165], the Court considered and allowed D1/D2’s application for security for costs. The main issue was whether the Claimant had made out its argument that the claim would be stifled if security was ordered.
After considering extensive evidence on this point, including foreign investigative journalist reporting and a forensic investigatory report commissioned by D1/D2, Eady J found that the Claimant had failed to provide the requisite “full, frank, clear and unequivocal evidence” (Al-Koronky [2005] EWHC 1688 (QB)) as to the potential sources of support that might be available to it ([154]ff). She was not satisfied that she had been given the true picture as to who owned or controlled the Claimant or who might stand to benefit from the Claimant’s pursuit of the litigation and she was not persuaded that the claim would be stifled by an order for security ([161]).
Simon Gilson acted for the First and Second Defendants, instructed by Stone King LLP.